1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	No. 1:09-cr-10243-MLW
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5	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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7	vs.
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9	RYAN HARRIS
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13	For Hearing Before:
14	Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf
15	Contempt Hearing
16	
17	United States District Court District of Massachusetts (Boston.)
18	One Courthouse Way Boston, Massachusetts 02210
19	Tuesday, February 1, 2012
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22	REPORTER: RICHARD H. ROMANOW, RPR
23	Official Court Reporter United States District Court
24	One Courthouse Way, Room 5200, Boston, MA 02210 bulldog@richromanow.com
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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (Begins, 4:00 p.m.) THE CLERK: Criminal Matter 09-10243, the 3 4 United States of America versus Ryan Harris. The Court 5 is in session. You may now be seated. THE COURT: Good afternoon. Would counsel 6 7 please identify themselves for the Court and for the 8 record. MR. BOOKBINDER: Good afternoon, your Honor. 9 10 Adam Bookbinder and Mona Sedky for the United States. 11 MR. McGINTY: Your Honor, for Mr. Harris, 12 Charles McGinty, from the Federal Defender's Office, and with me is Miriam Conrad. 13 14 THE COURT: Mr. Harris, as I understand, is on 15 the telephone, correct? 16 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, your Honor. 17 (Pause.) 18 THE COURT: I'd like to try to assure that we share an accurate and complete understanding of the 19 20 history of events that brings us here today. On December 13, 2011, I conducted a lengthy 21 22 hearing. I denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 23 scheduled the trial of this case for February 21, 2012, 24 which was actually two weeks later than it had been 25 previously scheduled. In addition, I discussed with the

parties a number of novel and challenging issues regarding the law concerning conspiracy, wire fraud, and aiding and abetting, as those concepts apply to this case, which raises a number of novel and challenging issues. I discussed the issues the parties had recognized and I identified and discussed issues that I had discerned. I cited cases for the parties that I thought were relevant and said I would, eventually, the next day, I did provide them with lengthy jury instructions that I had given last year in *United States* vs. DiMasi*. I set a schedule for pretrial submissions and put aside at least two mornings to conduct hearings on the issues that I expect will come into sharper focus in the briefing that I ordered.

On December 14, 2011, I issued a written order memorializing what was stated on December 13, orally. Among other things I ordered the parties to file, by January 13, 2012, motions in limine with supporting memos, proposed jury instructions, trial briefs that address the major issues I had identified and other disputes relating to the jury instructions, disputes that should have been identified because I had ordered the parties to confer before making their submissions.

I established January 25 as the date for responses to their motions in limine. I scheduled hearings on

February 7th and 8th, 2012 to address the foreseeable -or at least foreseen, anticipated motions in limine and
the legal issues that would be necessary to make
evidentiary rulings at trial -- that would have to be
resolved for me to make rulings at trial and instruct
the jury.

Yesterday, January 31, 2012, as I intended to begin working in anticipation of the hearing scheduled for next week, I found that the government had made submissions on January 13th, although it raises issues in its trial brief that should have been raised in motions in limine with more meaningful briefing. There are no memos in support of the evidentiary issues. I also found that defendant's counsel, Charles McGinty, had made no submissions in response to the December 14 order nor had he requested any extension of time to do so.

I therefore issued an order on January 31 directing Assistant Federal Public Defender McGinty and Federal Public Defender Miriam Conrad to appear today to seek to show cause why I should not institute civil and/or criminal contempt proceedings against Mr. McGinty for his failure to obey the December 14, 2011 order.

Mr. McGinty yesterday moved for an extension of time to make the previously-ordered filings. I did not

allow that motion. I did endorse it noting that any issue of civil contempt would be moot if all the submissions that I previously ordered were made by the time of this hearing, 4:00 on February 1, and stating that the issue of possible criminal intent would, in any event, remain.

On the evening of January 31, Mr. McGinty filed a trial brief and voir dire questions. The trial brief includes many matters toward the end which are essentially motions in limine, they are not -- while occasional cases are cited for some of the points, there are no supporting memos as required by Local Rule 7.1 and by the express terms of the pretrial order in this case. Those evidentiary issues are issues that the government's been deprived of for two weeks roughly that I intended the government would have to respond.

As I noted in the January 31, 2012 order, I've encountered similar problems with Mr. McGinty before.

As I recall, I expressly warned Mr. McGinty that future problems of this sort could result in sanctions, including contempt. I also had Ms. Conrad into court to express concerns about, I believe, Mr. McGinty and also other assistant federal public defenders failing to meet deadlines, which I don't interpret generally or in this case as any expression of disrespect to the Court

personally, but is something that is deeply injurious to the Court's ability to properly control its calendar and prepare to decide an important matter. And Mr. McGinty and Ms. Conrad should feel encouraged to confirm whether my memory of our prior colloquies is correct. But in this particular case, the failure to make timely and complete filings is threatening, if not injuring, my ability to make properly-informed judgments on challenging issues in an usual case.

I have not instituted civil or criminal contempt proceedings, but if there are going to be criminal contempt proceedings or civil contempt proceedings, they'll be pursuant to formal notice and an opportunity to be heard. If there are criminal contempt proceedings, it's a criminal case and based on what I know, I don't imagine the sanction will be more than 6 months in prison or jail or custody, so it would be a bench trial, and Mr. McGinty would have all of the rights of any criminal defendant.

I ordered Ms. Conrad to be here because it's the Federal Public Defender's Office appointed to represent Mr. Harris in this case and it's Federal Public Defender's responsibility to assure that Court orders are obeyed.

I state what I hope will be obvious, but it might

not be clear to Mr. Harris, that he's not going to be punished in any way because of his counsel's failure to obey orders. What I'm actually concerned about is the fact that I haven't, in a timely way, been given by the defendant any of the information that is required to be submitted by January 13 and I still haven't got all of it. And my goal, in part, is to make sure that Mr. Harris is very effectively represented and he's not going to be prejudiced by me or anybody else because I've unfortunately had to deal with this issue concerning his counsel.

So I'd like to give Mr. McGinty and Ms. Conrad an opportunity to address this as I decide the immediate issues of whether to institute civil and/or criminal contempt proceedings.

MR. McGINTY: Your Honor, um, this Court entered an order, the order was quite clear, I failed to meet the requirements of the order. I did not do it deliberately. Nonetheless, um, I have responsibilities to meet and I didn't meet them.

THE COURT: Well, what do you mean you didn't do it deliberately?

MR. McGINTY: Pardon?

THE COURT: I'm not sure what you mean when you say you didn't do it --

MR. McGINTY: I intended no affront to the Court and I certainly understood the gravity of the issues here and did not intend to do anything which would diminish the opportunity to address these issues and address them appropriately.

I have been preparing a second case which took me out of the United States between January 4th and January 20th. I failed in my calendaring of the responsibilities in this case. I spoke to Mr. Harris last night and I told him that the Court had entered an order which reflected on both my diligence and my commitment to the case, that order is a significant judgment on the quality of work that I've done, and Mr. Harris ought to be mindful of that in listening to what transpires at this hearing and making a judgment about whether I serve his interests properly. I do not recall --

THE COURT: Well -- I'm sorry.

MR. McGINTY: I do not recall, and I say this having searched my memory, I do not recall an instance where the Court addressed me on the subject of contempt or my failure to file or my failure to address an issue properly. I say that having searched my memory. I have, um, attempted in this court, perhaps more than in some other courts, but I have attempted in this court to

attend to responsibilities that have been assigned to me and do it in proper fashion.

THE COURT: And just to be careful. This is why I invited you to either confirm or correct my memory. It's conceivable that I've confused something that we've had -- that I had with one of your colleagues with you. I think -- and I must say that I've been doing many other things today, too, and I put that order out very quickly yesterday. I had to because we have hearings next week and my schedule is very busy. We're going to use all the time I've set aside for the hearings and for the trial.

If I made a mistake about our prior history together, and I may have, um, I'm sorry I did that and maybe Ms. Conrad will be able to clarify who she and I were speaking about. I assume she remembers our colloquies.

But go ahead.

MR. McGINTY: I will say I have searched my memory and I have tried to -- I'd even looked through chronology of cases, trying to unearth the instance where I fell short, um, of an obligation in a case where the Court brought it to my attention and where the issue of contempt or the consequences or a penalty or a discipline or anything of that sort was ever raised with

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me and frankly I --
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                THE COURT: And for present purposes, I'm
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     going to accept that.
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                MR. McGINTY: Now, um, I have --
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                THE COURT: Subject to learning something
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     else.
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                MR. McGINTY: I have tried in this case to
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     raise the issues which I thought were fairly raised by
     the indictment. I raised those understanding and
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     appreciating that this court takes those issues
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     seriously. So in each briefing I've done, I've tried to
     address cases both favorable and unfavorable. I've
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     tried to place it in a light that expresses as best I
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     can what I think are the novel issues that are, um --
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     are raised in this case and the novel issues which I
     think sort of push the law beyond what any known cases
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     have permitted. I've done that as carefully as I've
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     could. I've tried to raise every issue I could possibly
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     raise.
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                THE COURT: But you raised nothing, you
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     addressed nothing on January 13th. You filed nothing.
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                MR. McGINTY: And I have no excuse for that.
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     I have none. You know, a failure -- and I told this to
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     my client. I have -- you know, where there's an
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     obligation to file papers, I have the obligation to meet
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that date. I didn't do that here.

THE COURT: And you or somebody must have been doing some work on this because what you filed last night, um, didn't look like you had written it in just a couple of hours.

MR. McGINTY: No, I've been working on this case. I was in Judge Saylor's session just last week trying to get access to some impeachment material that I might use in connection with one of the government's witnesses. The government was there as well. There has been -- I have tried to parse in this case, as best I can, what I think are a series of issues, sorting them and identifying how they interrelate with one another, and this has posed some difficulty. I have tried as best I can to sort those. I had drafted papers to do that.

So yesterday, no, I didn't, last night, try to, um, write -- without having outlined, without having tried to thought through or think through what exactly would be the issues that would have to be addressed in the papers.

I am dismayed by my failure, um, and I tried to make that plain to Mr. Harris, because apart from apologizing to the Court, he has little way of assessing whether a lawyer is acting appropriately, diligently,

carefully, and responsibly, and his few ways of doing that depend upon judgments that are relatively underinformed. So he has to rely on me and failing to do something in time to raise issues before the Court is a significant dereliction, and I told him that, and I told him that he has to make a judgment about whether this reflects on my larger commitment to the case and my larger preparation to the case, because I think it does.

So I am dismayed in my failure to meet the Court's order. I am dismayed at the failure to raise issues which I think are consequential in how this court frames instructions to the jury on how the Court identifies what issues the jury is going to address and how that's going to be framed for them. There are numerous novel issues here and it aids the Court not a bit to have those presentations made untimely.

I would say with respect to the motions in limine, um, the difficulty that I had in framing this is in trying, um, to try to find an order and coherence to the contest to the way the government is presenting the case and -- so that certain of the issues that are in the memorandum are addressed in one frame, um -- so, for example, the issue of the rim on the conspiracy, um, depends upon issues that relate to a web forum and how that web forum -- whether the content of the web forum

is admissible and under what circumstances.

So in the papers I'm addressing multiply the issue of the admissibility and the consequence of the admission of those things because they interrelate to a number of issues that sort of weave through the presentation.

THE COURT: Well, the -- I've read, but not studied your submission and the government's trial brief, and some of these issues are issues that I either identified or amplified when you were here on December 13th. They're serious issues. I pointed you and -- it's in my written order, to my *Pappathanase* decision, the only time in almost 27 years I've granted a Rule 29 on a whole case, that a particular conspiracy charge was not a conspiracy that could have been proven on the evidence. And these are challenging issues. And I can see you're doing some work on them.

MR. McGINTY: And I tried to address

Pappathanase several times in my brief to sort of develop the issue.

THE COURT: I know. I know. And -- well, let me see what Ms. Conrad has to say about all of this.

MS. CONRAD: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, first of all, with respect to the question about prior interactions about these types of

issues, I recall one occasion probably about five years ago, if memory serves, I think the issue was the late filing of a sentencing memorandum by another assistant public offender, um, not --

THE COURT: Who is that?

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MS. CONRAD: Oscar Cruz.

THE COURT: Yeah, it occurred to me today that I may have confused Mr. McGinty with Mr. Cruz.

MS. CONRAD: I am aware of one other instance in which the Court had expressed its displeasure about a missed deadline. I don't remember the details. not recall that I appeared in court on that matter. believe the instance with Mr. Cruz was the only instance. I, at that time informed the staff or reminded the staff of the importance of meeting deadlines, the importance of not simply presuming that a motion for leave -- a motion for leave to file late would be allowed and simply letting the deadline blow And in particular I discussed and have discussed those issues with Mr. McGinty on many occasions, not because of any concern I had about his ability to meet those, but because he's the First Assistant Federal Public Defender and in that capacity we discuss administrative and supervisory issues on a regular basis, and I know he's well aware and has joined me in

reminding the staff of the importance of these things.

I am ultimately convinced that Mr. McGinty simply failed to report the deadlines in a place where he would be reminded of it and I think that was compounded by the fact that he was out of the country in a different time zone from January 4th through January 20th working on a case where largely he was in Rwanda with limited ability to communicate with the office. So I think that there is — this was absolutely an instance of, at most, negligence.

However, I also want to emphasize that with respect to the entirety of this case, it is not a reflection of neglect of this case. Mr. McGinty has been working very hard on this case for quite some time. Um, I pass his office on the way in in the morning. I pass his office on the way out in the evening. He is in early, he's been meeting with others. He's been working on the case, researching the case and preparing for trial. And I know that he has devoted and dedicated himself to this case as he does with all of his cases. And I don't think there's any question that, um, this was an instance in which he simply put the case on the back burner and neglected to attend to it.

THE COURT: Well, when I saw Mr. McGinty in

December, he told me he had another major case, um, beginning I think in April, um, maybe even earlier, and he actually was asking for the February 6th trial date because he wanted to interview witnesses after that.

And he has, up to this point, you know, paid serious attention to the case and he's certainly capable of doing it, but in my view you share substantial responsibility for this. The case is assigned to you, the Federal Public Defender, you decide how to staff it.

Mr. McGinty keeps telling me, and I don't think he's exaggerating, that this case is unprecedented or particularly presents novel challenging issues. You know, in many -- you know, if he's got that other major matter and he's got this case and he can't do both of them in a timely way, um, you've got other people in your office. And, in fact, typically, I believe, these days two assistant federal defenders as well as two prosecutors show up in every case, including felon in possession cases. As I recall when you were before me in Andrews recently, you had somebody sitting next to you, but I don't know what she did.

MS. CONRAD: She's not an assistant federal public defender.

THE COURT: The point is, um, it strikes me

that this is an institutional failure as well as an individual failure. I've actually had some discussion since yesterday with about five of my colleagues who --well, they haven't had this problem, they've had others with Mr. McGinty's colleagues and outside the context of this case I expect you'll be informed of those and they'll be addressed.

MS. CONRAD: Well, I certainly welcome their feedback, your Honor. I try to monitor things as best I can. The only reason I point out the issue as far as an assistant public defender as well as another type of lawyer is that we do have in our office a research and writing specialist who provides substantial assistance on the cases. But we also are attempting to staff our cases in a way where we can maximize the percentage of indigent cases that we can take and that does not necessarily entail having double staffing trials, unlike, I'd say, most of the U.S. Attorneys do. We have done that, in the past, for training purposes, but it is not the rule of thumb.

THE COURT: Well, we're not at trial and this was in part a failure with regard to research and writing.

MS. CONRAD: Right.

THE COURT: There are novel issues. I -- that

were identified by the parties. There were issues identified by me. Did you read my December 14th order?

MS. CONRAD: I did.

THE COURT: I thought you would. You know,
I'm pointing out cases, I'm sculpting questions that are
not ordinarily done. And aren't those the type of
matters that your research and writing specialist
assists on?

MS. CONRAD: Yes, and I believe that

Mr. McGinty has had the assistance of a research and

writing specialist in this case, which is probably one

of the reasons why he was able to file a thorough memo

last night. It was simply a failure to, um,

internalize, if you will, what the deadline was. It was

not a failure to do the underlying work.

THE COURT: Well --

MS. CONRAD: I know that Mr. McGinty was appalled when he realized that he had missed this deadline. I was present when the order -- he called me immediately when he received the order. I was already aware of the order. And, um, he was quite abashed and flummoxed by the fact that he had done this. But --

THE COURT: And this was -- I confidently assumed yesterday that this wasn't intended to be disrespectful of the court and I'm confirmed in that

assumption. My concern is for my ability to manage a very busy calendar and to decide challenging issues on an informed basis, which requires that they be briefed well, sufficiently far in advance, so the parties have a chance to address each other's arguments and so I can study them and make informed decisions. I've carved out at least two mornings next week to do that. And my focus -- our focus is now going to be on what remains to be done, um, so I can try to accomplish what I intended to accomplish next week and so anything further that needs to be done before February 21, um, when we start trial, will be done and so the trial can proceed as efficiently as possible, because it is going to proceed on that date.

When I have everything that I previously ordered -- and the government's got more work to do, too, um, there will be no more issue of civil contempt. Civil contempt is intended to compel compliance with orders. Potentially there's the issue of criminal contempt, but, um, at the moment I'm not inclined to go in that direction either, but I haven't -- it's not what I intend to focus on right now.

I don't have any actual motions in limine, I don't have any memos in support of them, and I don't have it from the government either. And I think the

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government's treatment of a number of these evidentiary
issues have been far too casual. I think I said this in
December, but -- I know I can conditionally admit
co-conspirator hearsay. I also have the authority to
require that all of the evidence that you're going to
use be presented first. In most cases I wouldn't do
      But it's not clear to me, from reading the
government's trial brief, who the alleged
co-conspirators are as to whom I'm making Petrozziello
rulings and it's not even clear to me that the
government's identified the people who made the
statements or want submitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
And if you've got cases -- and maybe you mentioned it,
but if you've got cases that say something can come in
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) without identifying a declarant,
um, that's not a common issue. And that's by way of
example, because I haven't studied it.
      Of course I'm offended that it was at about 8:00
last night you raised some issues that seem to be --
well, they're at least new to me. I don't know to what
extent they're new to the government regarding
admissibility. Are they new, some of them?
          MR. BOOKBINDER: Some are, your Honor.
think that's fair to say.
          THE COURT: You're supposed to have two weeks
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-- not two weeks, but 12 days to address them. And I was supposed to have them the 25th to the 7th to work on them.

I don't issue orders that I don't intend to enforce and I don't issue orders that I feel are impossible to obey, but my inclination is to order the defendant and the government to convert their submissions regarding the evidentiary issues into motions in limine, discrete documents, each with a supporting memo, just as stated in the pretrial order and just as stated in Rule 7.1, and to have them filed by 9:00 on Friday morning -- unless you persuasively tell me that's not feasible, and if it's not, tell me.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Your Honor, from the government's perspective, could I have a moment to consult?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Thank you.

(Pause.)

MR. BOOKBINDER: Your Honor, from the government's perspective, if you're talking about us filing motions in limine to admit essentially the co-conspirator statements, um, and I think we've now --we're now in a position where we've narrowed and focused more on those statements than we had when we filed the

trial brief. So we ought to be able to file something about that by Friday morning. I think if what the Court's looking for is for us to respond to the issues Mr. McGinty raised, that may be difficult.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm just -- maybe I'm -- but you raised a couple of issues -- evidentiary issues.

It's Page 26, regarding the post -- you cite some cases there. You've come closer to what I had in mind.

On this issue of co-conspirator statements, I just told you what I thought, but, you know, it's true as far as it goes on Page 29 that, under **Petrozziello** I can conditionally admit -- I think I said this in December, but maybe I didn't. I also have, as I said, the discretion to require that you make a substantial showing either before trial or with your first witnesses. I don't want to try this case for three weeks and then tell the jury, um, they have to disregard a substantial amount of evidence. That's going to invite a mistrial and maybe precipitate it.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Your Honor, it may be helpful to -- we've got some clarification on what our witness order is going to be and when things will come in and the posts --

THE COURT: I don't want to hear about this now.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Okay, but we may get --

THE COURT: But here's the issue. You know, I didn't see in your submission who you want me to make Petrozziello rulings on. What you should give me is the names of all those people and what the evidence is going to be that they made the statements in furtherance of some conspiracy, not necessarily a conspiracy in this case -- and there are First Circuit cases that you could cite for that proposition, um, and then, you know, we're scheduled to start on Tuesday morning with these issues, on Tuesday morning, on Wednesday morning, and then I thought I wasn't going to see you again until we started trial.

Mr. McGinty, you know, starting on Page 19 of your memorandum you filed last night, there's a whole series of statements with the citation of virtually no cases, um, that various forms of proposed evidence are inadmissible. Each of those is, in fact, a motion in limine.

Is your office able to supplement this by Friday morning?

MR. McGINTY: Yes.

THE COURT: And I think these are -- because of the novelty of the case, you know, I think these are serious issues. And the reason I directed you -- I also

don't have -- the trial memo makes some mention of jury instruction issues, again, without much authority on them. The government's proposed jury instructions, which I've only glanced at, seem to me to be too generic for this case and this is why I asked you to confer to try to identify the issues. But I don't have any proposed jury instruction from the defendant, including the trial brief. I mean, there's some mention particularly of --

MR. McGINTY: I differ -- I differ. There's a list of instructions with footnotes in support of them, instructions that create the balance --

THE COURT: I want a complete set of substantive instructions as I typically, um, would get so I can read one and read the other. I mean, this is helpful. This is a beginning.

MR. McGINTY: Your Honor, the difficulty is that I can't -- I can't foresee the government's case surviving Rule 29. I can't. So my difficult in framing --

THE COURT: But this is exactly why -- what

I'm ordering you to do, what I previously ordered you to
do is so important. Because I can't make informed

evidentiary rulings unless I have a good sense of what

I'm going to instruct at the end of the case. And it

evolves. It evolves. That's one. And, two, um, you need that for a Rule 29. I don't need proposed instructions on reasonable doubt.

But I essentially am looking to -- what I was -if you had all done what I directed you -- ordered you
to do on December 13th and 14th, these issues would now
be in much sharper focus. I would have a better idea of
what the government is going to need to prove to survive
a Rule 29 motion. And now I'll look the this. It's
helpful. But it doesn't strike me as complete.

MR. McGINTY: If I could just frame my difficulty.

The government's view, and they express it in one of their instructions, is that the inherent susceptibility of a sole object to be misused is -- can support a finding of a conspiracy with this, between the seller and the purchaser, and aiding and abetting of the seller, um, of the conduct of the purchaser. Now, I can't find any cases that support that. And I would submit that *Direct Sales* says quite the opposite.

So in terms of my framing an instruction that guides the jury to understand a proposition which I don't think is supported in the law, I can't do it.

THE COURT: I think we had some of this discussion in December. You talked about the hammer --

or was that another case?

MR. McGINTY: But I think that --

THE COURT: You know, if you sell somebody a hammer, it's not intrinsically illegal, but if somebody — I think I said this in December. If somebody says to you, you know, at Home Depot, "Sell me a hammer. I want to go home and bash my wife's skull and kill her and collect the insurance," and the guy says, "I'm happy to sell you a hammer for that purpose and, you know, you're not just going to pay me for the hammer, you're going to pay me another 1,000 bucks." The hammer's an overt act.

MR. McGINTY: That conspiracy involves a person being drawn into the specific conduct. That's the -- precisely the problem here is that that's not the case. And what I tried to do in the motion to dismiss is to say that the government's summary of what their evidence is going to be is that three of the four purchases, purchased without conversation, without communication, without expression of what they were going to do, with no information between conveyed between buyer and purchaser. So under those circumstances, for me to frame an instruction that gives the jury to understand what the boundaries are of the law that helps them distill that, I can't do it because the answer is that's not a proposition supported by the

law. Direct Sales.

THE COURT: So you would just write out what you would like me to say to the jury.

MR. McGINTY: And that's exactly what I did. So turn to Page 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

THE COURT: Okay. So where do you define here the elements of wire fraud?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ McGINTY: I did not put the elements down there and I apologize for that.

But in terms of the boundaries particular to this case and in terms of what the propositions are that's going to guide the jury's evaluation of the facts, I can't give structure to a theory that I don't think is supported in the law. I don't know how to do that.

THE COURT: You don't have to give me their theory, I want you to give me -- I've ordered you. I'm ordering you again, to give me -- you know what proposed jury instructions look like. Your office files them in almost every case. But the generic pattern instructions require considerable tailoring and I gave you elaborate conspiracy instructions.

There's no proposed instruction here that I recall seeing, for example, about venue. This is a case that involves the jury being required to find something that I can't ever remember having instructed on. Doesn't the

government have to prove venue? That was part of your motion to dismiss.

MR. McGINTY: I remember it quite well and I --

THE COURT: I want a set of documents that I can use to fashion jury instructions. When I have the jury instructions from the two sides, it will bring into sharper focus for me what I have to resolve and give me a framework that I expect will evolve, as I continue to work on it, to decide the foreseeable Rule 20 -- to decide the evidentiary issues. In other words, it's not that evidence of a hammer is inadmissible, but it's not alone enough, it's not intrinsically unlawful to buy a hammer. Um, it will assist me in making evidentiary rulings. It will give me a framework -- certainly your view of the framework as to how I would decide a Rule 29 motion.

And I think -- and I'll study this far more, but I think there are -- based on what I've been told, there are substantial questions about whether the conspiracy charged can be proven.

In fact, where is Mr. Hanshaw now?

MR. BOOKBINDER: Mr. Hanshaw, your Honor, is now in custody. We had a final revocation hearing last week. That's what Mr. McGinty had hinted at as well.

His release has been revoked. He is in custody for the next four months. So he will be a witness.

THE COURT: Okay. Here, I want those jury instructions in their familiar form. Even your positions on them might evolve.

But can that be done by Friday, too?

MR. McGINTY: Well, I can't -- I will try to
do that by Friday by 5:00 p.m.

Um, your Honor, I don't mean to belabor this point, but I read the government's instruction on when it is a seller of an object can be complicit in a conspiracy. It creates no cognizable standard that a jury could use in evaluating what passes for sufficiency to prove that.

In asking me to provide a responsive instruction to give life to a theory of culpability which I don't think is supported by law, I literally don't know how to do that.

Now, I can give the Court -- I can go through the instructions that the Court used in *DiMasi* and propose those to the Court, the omission is going to be that I can't furnish the theory that they have to give life to to explain how it is that a seller becomes responsible for consequential conduct of third parties. I mean, what is the knowledge component? What has to be

communicated? Do there have to be multiple sales? What are the predicates a jury evaluates to make complicity someone, who by operation of law, is not complicit without that added ingredient.

Now, if the example's going to be if someone's sold a knife and is told, "I'm going to take this and kill my wife tonight with this knife," I can write that instruction. That if the person identifies with precision the culpable conduct, that -- that -- I can write that. That's not --

THE COURT: Well, you write what you think needs to be proven and cite the authority and some of it, I'm sure, or maybe all of it's in your footnotes. I want to know what you think I should tell the jury. And then the government will know, we'll see the differences, and I'll be able to focus on it.

I'll give you until 4:00 on Friday to do that by.

And then we'll start, as scheduled, on Tuesday morning.

I have until 1:00. We'll continue on Wednesday morning,

I expect. We'll get as far as we can get. That's all

we'll do next week. And we'll see what remains to be

done before trial.

The government needs to -- let me ask you this.

The defendant needs to respond to the government's motion in limine, motions in limine, and the government

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needs to respond to the defendant's. How about Monday
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     morning? Which means you need to finish all this --
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     except for perhaps Ms. Sedky, before 6:00 on Sunday
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     night when the Patriots play in the Superbowl.
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                MS. SEDKY: I will not be watching, your
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     Honor.
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                THE COURT: That's what I meant.
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                MS. SEDKY: I will be happily working on the
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     briefing.
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                MR. BOOKBINDER: Um, your Honor, yes, we'll
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     file our responses by Monday morning. If I could just
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     clarify --
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                THE COURT: I'm going to say by 9:30 on Monday
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     morning. You're both going to finish your motions in
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     limine, submit them on Friday. Did I give you a time?
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     What did I say, 9:00? You can make that --
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           Is that what I said?
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                (Pause.)
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                THE COURT: Well, go to 10:00. All right?
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     And we'll give you a written order on this, too.
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                MR. BOOKBINDER: Your Honor, I just want to
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     clarify and make sure I understand, because we don't
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     want to -- we want to provide what will to be helpful to
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     the Court. I think there were -- the issue that, um,
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     the Court would like us to address in our motions is
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about the co-conspirator statements that we mention in
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     the trial brief, um, who the speakers are, um, and why.
     What the evidence is that the -- that we will be
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     presenting that these people are co-conspirators.
     that correct?
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                THE COURT: Just a second.
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                (Pause.)
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                THE COURT: Starting on page -- on Page 28 are
     the issues about the co-conspirator hearsay. You can
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     tell the defendant and me now.
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           Is the government going to be trying to get
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     admitted as co-conspirator hearsay statements by
     unidentified individuals?
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                MR. BOOKBINDER: Your Honor, if I could have
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     one second.
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                THE COURT: Yes.
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                (Pause.)
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                MR. BOOKBINDER: Your Honor, the reason we
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     hesitate in answering are there are two sets of what
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     would qualify as co-conspirator statements. There are
     the posts, and the posts are discussed on Page 28, and
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     there are also -- and starting on Page 26, I guess. And
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     then there are also a set of what are chats, which are
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     conversations between Mr. Harris and a specific
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     individual. On four of the posts, um, we know who those
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people are. They use, you know, nicknames to post -what we have, um, the records would show what people
bought and what are their names. So in those cases
they're not unidentified. We do know who they are.

But for the chats, there are conversations between Mr. Harris and, um, some of them are between people who are going to be witnesses in the case, so there's obviously a question about who they are, and they're between people who are going to be co-conspirators, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Hanshaw. There are also chats with other people who are not witnesses and who we only know by nicknames. In those cases, um, I believe that our position is -- and we'll crystallize this for the Court, is that we are not seeking to introduce for their truth statements made by these other people who we don't know who they are. Any statements of theirs would come in, if at all, to show context for what Mr. Harris says or to show their effect on him. So we would not be seeking to introduce those as co-conspirator statements and I think that's the distinction that we're going to make.

THE COURT: I want you to identify at least a sample of each of those, so it's not an abstract concept for me, and you've cited some cases for these propositions, but, you know, what propositions are you relying on? How -- you know, "These statements like the

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closely.

following are not being entered for their truth" -although -- well, I need the statement. If some unidentified person says, "Your product is great. permits me to steal Internet service. I'm saving a fortune and ripping off Comcast, which I hate, " I don't know whether you regard that as being for the truth or not. MR. BOOKBINDER: That's a good question. THE COURT: Well, there's a good argument it's for the truth and I think it's probably for the truth because if you -- it seems to me that if you have to -you know, you've undertaken to say -- to prove -- to say you recognize you should prove, you're required to prove that Mr. Harris knew that the product would be used by particular people to get something of value without paying from the internet service providers. MR. BOOKBINDER: Your Honor, we will flesh it out in what we file and we will attach at least samples of all of the --THE COURT: All right. MR. BOOKBINDER: Your Honor, you also -- you know, you refer to the jury instructions and the fact that --THE COURT: I'll have to look at them more

MR. BOOKBINDER: That you thought they may be too generic.

THE COURT: I'll look at them. I haven't studied them.

MR. BOOKBINDER: So we won't plan to deal with that until Friday.

THE COURT: I'll take a look at them. See in view of what Mr. McGinty filed, whether you think they require some refinement. This is already injuring our ability to work the way I intend to work. But, you know, we're starting a trial in three weeks, and I'll say the following.

Mr. Harris, are you still there?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am.

THE COURT: Um, in Mr. McGinty you have a very experienced, intelligent, and energetic lawyer. No lawyer has just one case and he made a disturbing mistake in this case, up till now, in the last month. Having said that, he knows your case. I expect that he and Ms. Conrad are going to make sure that not only he, but whoever else is necessary, um, will work on representing you. A person with court-appointed counsel does not have a right to whoever he wants to represent him, there has to be a good reason to replace counsel, and particularly as trial approaches.

So you can talk to Mr. McGinty about whatever you want to talk to him about. If any motions are filed, I'll deal with them. But nobody should fail to obey any of my orders because he or she thinks that this case is not going to proceed on the schedule that I've established.

And, Ms. Conrad, the order I'm going to issue, probably tomorrow, is going to direct you to discharge what is your responsibility anyway, to make sure that all orders in this case are obeyed. It's your office that's appointed. And while I certainly don't expect there's going to be any repetition of this problem in this case, if there is, the order's directed to you as well as Mr. McGinty and anybody who may appear with him.

It's very unfortunate that any of us have had to spend time on this, but, as I've said, we've got three weeks until trial. We'll do what's necessary to start that trial and I trust to finish it on schedule and I think it raises a lot of interesting issues, many of them identified by Mr. McGinty.

Is there anything further for today?

MS. CONRAD: Not from me, your Honor.

MR. BOOKBINDER: Not from the government, your

25 Honor.

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                THE COURT: All right. The Court is in
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     recess.
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                (Ends, 5:00 p.m.)
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                      CERTIFICATE
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           I, RICHARD H. ROMANOW, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, do
     hereby certify that the forgoing transcript of the
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     record is a true and accurate transcription of my
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     stenographic notes, before Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf, on
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     Tuesday, February 1, 2012, to the best of my skill and
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     ability.
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     /s/ Richard H. Romanow 11-06-12
     RICHARD H. ROMANOW Date
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